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Abstract—Today’s cellular telecommunications markets re-
quire continuous monitoring and intervention by regulators in
order to balance the interests of various stakeholders. In order
to reduce the extent of regulatory involvements in the day-to-day
business of cellular operators, the present paper proposes a “self-
regulating” spectrum market regime named “society spectrum”.
This regime provides a market-inherent and automatic self-
balancing of stakeholder powers, which at the same time provides
a series of coordination and fairness assurance functions that
clearly distinguish it from “spectrum as a commons” solutions.
The present paper will introduce the fundamental regulatory
design and will elaborate on mechanisms to assure fairness
among stakeholders and individuals. This work further puts the
society spectrum into the context of contemporary radio access
technologies and cognitive radio approaches.
Keywords—Spectrum; Market; Self-Regulation; Coordination;
Society Spectrum; Fairness
I. INTRODUCTION
In economics, distributed equilibria and especially self-
regulating systems are preferable over centralized mechanisms
due to their simplicity. Today’s telecommunications market is,
however, a good way off this ideal situation. The regulator
needs to actively monitor and moderate markets in order
to not only balance the market powers of consumers and
providers but also among smaller and larger providers. With
the emergence of and controversies around Net Neutrality,
the regulator’s role has substantially been extended towards
monitoring discriminatory actions on the content axis—either
due to foreclosure (excluding measures) or sabotage (qual-
ity degradations)—following Ofcom’s taxonomy in [1]). This
view has been supported by recent side payment deals from
data hungry content providers such as Netflix1 to incumbent
network operators such as Comcast or Verizon.
Along the lines of other industries’ experiences, e.g., avi-
ation mergers [2], we observe a direct relationship between
the number of directly competing network operators and the
attractivity of their product offerings3 (price, quality, etc.).
Hence, operators tend to seek for market consolidation, while
consumers desire a more fragmented market.
1Netflix is currently issuing side payments to Comcast2 in order to provide
the expected service quality.
3Prices have sharply increased following a recent merger of cellular network
operators in Austria. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dba557c8-9c91-11e3-b535-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3RQPEsdk3. last accessed: May 5, 2019
Another battle ground [3] emerges around spectrum com-
petition constellations in the unlicensed spectrum and its
intermingling with licensed technologies (i.e., LTE-U) that aim
at competing with Wi-Fi.
Under these circumstances, the work of regulatory bodies
has become tremendously difficult, aiming to support (at the
same time):
1) Incentives to invest in state-of-the-art infrastructure cov-
ering the majority of the population and the considered
geographical area;
2) The creation of reasonable market pressures protecting
the interests of consumers, which includes mechanisms
to avoid typical market failures and markets issues such
as collusion, too high or too low competition, myopic
investment decisions, etc.;
3) Fairness among users but also competitors;
4) The assurance of basic Internet connectivity in order to
lower the digital divide;
5) The availability assurance of ubiquitous high quality
Internet, e.g., meeting the demands of industrial use cases
(e.g., with respect to Industry 4.0); and
6) The avoidance of overregulation that hampers market
mechanisms to properly function.
When concentrating on radio access and spectrum markets,
neither today’s unlicensed (e.g., Wi-Fi) nor licensed spectrum
(e.g., LTE) solutions entirely meet those standards without
active regulatory intervention all the way from the operational
to the strategic level. Unlicensed spectrum still lacks in co-
ordination and incentives to massively deploy infrastructure
also in rural areas, which may lead to coverage, quality
and fairness issues, and also may entail colliding commercial
interests (see [3]). The licensed spectrum on the other hand is
strictly regulated and requires constant intervention to assure
its functioning. Wrong decisions (such as during spectrum
auctions) may not be able to be corrected for the subsequent
years, which appears overly complex and inflexible.
For these reasons, the present paper proposes the establish-
ment of a novel agency-assisted self-regulated [4] and highly
transparent spectrum market that meets all defined goals. This
market approach takes the positive characteristics of both the
unlicensed and licensed spectrum approaches in order to min-
imize the required regulatory interventions, while still almost
perfectly balancing all stakeholders’ interests in the long run.
This goal is targeted by proposing the concept of a society
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spectrum as a relief spectrum for market pressure fluctuations
that may harm the sustainability of the entire ecosystem from
the consumers’ or the operators’ point of view. The society
spectrum will automatically counteract insufficiently function-
ing markets arising due to collusion, insufficient competition,
too high competition, bargaining powers (e.g., due to managing
the access to scarce spectrum), etc.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows: After
reviewing related works in Section II, a structural separation
of markets powers is presented in Section III as prerequsite
for a clean market design. The core contribution, i.e., a self-
regulating market regime, is presented in Section IV. Concepts
assuring fairness among users and operators are introduced
in Section V and associated to a radio and access network
technology perspective. The access to a fair share of the
spectrum is translated to the operator landscape in Section VI,
after which the paper is closes with concluding remarks in
Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
According to [5] and [6], regulators play a dual role as
preventers of market failures and as bodies acting in pub-
lic interest4. Regulation may “occur in the three traditional
components of separation of powers: legislation, enforcement,
and adjudication” where particular industries may be regulated
in any of those components [7]. Self-regulation as opposed
to “command and control” [8] (i.e., classical regulation) has
been a widely discussed topic spanning multiple industries and
research directions, e.g., see [8], [4], [9], [7]. The definitions
for self-regulation are widely diverging—e.g., Swire [7] inter-
prets self-regulation as set of self-imposed industry guidelines
and comparable measures (subject to “industry morality” [9]),
while Ogus [4] defines a series of self-regulation flavors
ranging from free market approaches to strict policies. For
clarity, the present paper will use self-regulation in the sense
of limiting the required regulatory interventions (“command
and control”) to a minimum, especially directing regulatory
measures more towards longer term strategic decisions instead
of close involvements in day-to-day operations. However,
similarly to [6], we acknowledge that an “Unconstrained Self-
regulation” (as defined in [4]) would be irresponsible when
acting upon public interest.
In 1980, Melody [10] in particular described spectrum
as “unique natural resource” that contrary to other natural
resources would require cooperation. Melody further stressed
that the spectrum allocation will likely involve administrative
processes in assistance to market mechanisms. Faulhaber &
Farber [11] added that spectrum as commons does not work
under scarcity, that is why “ownership models” are required
(denoted by exclusive spectrum in this work). Faulhaber &
Farber have further foreseen the dynamic and automated
realtime selling of exclusively owned spectrum and favor the
intermingling of spectrum as “commons” with exclusive spec-
trum, without detailing a new market setup. Recent research on
Cognitive Radio (CR) has also focused on developing means
for the more dynamic spectrum usage and economic utilization
[12]. This idea is often referred to as Dynamic Spectrum
4While in [6] the argumentation is mainly part of a content-centric analysis,
the abstract separation of concepts is still absolutely valid for the context of
spectrum regulation.
Access (DSA), which has received substantial attention in
technical, regulatory, and economic research so far, e.g., in
[13], [14]. Chapin et al. for example define triggers (“available
spectrum”, “customer demand”, “low transaction costs”) for
creating “liquidity” in the dynamic access of spectrum and
market opportunities for DSA-specific services. While reg-
ulatory certainty about the issuing and usage of secondary
spectrum is required, the risk of interferences has to be
minimal [13]. Optimal spectrum pricing for CDMA is further
discussed in [14]. Applicable to CR/DSA scenarios, Holland
et al. define the Pluralistic Licensing concept to improve
spectrum flexibility and autonomy in licensing [15]. Forde
et al. [16] have further envisioned a more dynamic spectrum
assignment enabled both via a virtualization of Radio Access
Networks (RANs) and especially due to the technological ad-
vancements around CRs, Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
and Long Term Evolution (LTE) Advanced. In their approach,
they transfer essential RAN functions to the cloud in order to
better integrate Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs).
Thus we conclude that spectrum represents a unique value
for the exclusive holders and that even more restricted sec-
ondary usage scenarios are of interest. Moreover, self-imposed
industry guidelines will be insufficient to target the complexity
of the telecommunications market, especially when assuming
limited industry morality (i.e., a useful common assumption).
The present work hence aims at establishing a system-inherent
self-regulation based on a redesigned spectrum market, which
is enacted by regulatory bodies. Following the position in [11]
the present work intermingles spectrum markets as commons
and exclusively operated alternatives in order to dynamically
react to market conditions, and hence to reduce the need for
regulatory interventions.
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The regulatory primary interest is to assure a sustainable
functioning of the respective market where sufficient compe-
tition is in place in order to balance the interests of involved
stakeholders (telecom operators, content providers, business
users, consumers, etc.). Another role of the provider may be
to mitigate the effects of digital divide by making technology
and the access to information accessible to anyone. For this
reason, mitgating the market power accumluation of individual
stakeholders is of central importance in order to lower the
probability of unbeneficial or even defective strategies, e.g.,
collusion. This role is addressed in this section by reconsider-
ing the separation of powers within the ecosystem.
Most operator services (such as SMS, telephony, etc.)
are today provisioned by exactly the same entity as the
infrastructure (providing the data connectivity). However, in
a world of technological convergence this creates potential
tensions between the interests of competing service providers
and the operator. While content providers may have to pay
for a preferential treatment of their traffic, if allowed by Net
Neutrality regulations in the specific market, those classical
services may have to be prioritized without additional charges
in order maintain the known quality standards. Even if the
providers had to split their revenues between service and
infrastructure departments, the process would be intransparent.
Referring to technological convergence, newly added capacity
could be associated to specific services only. Of course, follow-
ing a similar line of thought, this also opens the doors to pri-
oritization business models. This technological convergences
also stretches to the integration of unlicensed spectrum bands
in the context of cellular services (e.g., via LTE-U). Subtly
defining the licensed and unlicensed band cellular services
to be separate products, discriminatory practices could be
extended to determining whether a service is hosted only in
unlicensed or licensed, or in either sort of spectrum bands.
Hence, operators may be able to prize their interests above
others. For this reason, the essential prerequisite for a self-
regulating market is the reasonable separation of powers,
which starts by decoupling any kind of Internet-provided
service from the actual infrastructure (as moderator of the
publicly provided spectrum), i.e., totally independent corpo-
rations are required. Thus, operator-native voice services are
treated equally to external services and both have to face the
same charges (whether for basic termination and transmission
or for priority handling). This yields the following benefits:
1) Avoidance of unjustified preference of own services (not
in accordance to market prices); 2) Transparent overview of
market prices and costs; 3) Higher competition is established
in each part of the value chain, i.e., in operator-services,
infrastructures, contents, access business, etc.
Similar solutions have been introduced during the market
liberalization phase in the railway (analogies exist in the area
of price discrimination [17]) and energy domains where infras-
tructure operations, e.g., rail investment and maintenance or
Distribution System Operators (DSOs) respectively, have been
decoupled from the end customer business. Technologically,
this is enabled by recent efforts to virtualize essential network
functions, as described in [16].
The same line of thought can also be applied to the uti-
lization of spectrum, irrespectively of whether it is exclusively
licensed or publicly shared. Whenever the utilization of unli-
censed spectrum is left unregulated and is open for business
practices of big players, constellations may arise that lead to a
tragedy of commons [18] as illustrated in [3]. Contrary, Ostrom
et al. [19] argue that the direct access to common resources
can be collectively managed whenever physical access to the
resource and sound community relationships exist. While those
conditions may be met for privately operated Wi-Fi hotspots,
they can hardly be satisfied for larger networks with intrans-
parent spectrum usage and inaccessible deployment locations
for users. For this reason, a regulated or self-regulating market
has to protect the interest of the society and each individual.
This is today targeted by common regulatory policies that only
carefully grant exclusive spectrum access to ISPs under certain
market penetration and quality targets. In other words, public
spectrum has to be put into use for the society who owns
it. Another future regulation may have to focus on similar
measures in the unlicensed spectrum in order to keep the
competitive situation stable and the unlicensed spectrum open
for non-commercial usages.
IV. MARKET SELF-REGULATION VIA SOCIETY
SPECTRUM
We will now construct a competitive self-regulating [4]
cellular telecommunications market, following the stated sep-
aration of powers, by introducing the society spectrum. The
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self-regulation model may best be classified as “Independent
Agency-assisted Competition” (where the regulator is the
agency that represents the society for setting quality standards
and legal conditions) where only limited constraints are posed
to individual markets.
Today’s spectrum is exclusively assigned to commercial
network operators by using auction mechanisms (cf. Fig. 1,
Classical Setup and [10]). By meaningfully distributing spec-
trum among a number of network operators, a balanced market
is targeted, which is attractive both for the society (other
businesses, users, etc.) and the bidding operators. However,
market consolidations, if approved, may substantially shift
market powers, which may trigger actions by the regulators.
The market entrance of MVNOs is often seen as measure for
softly and dynamically adding competition towards obtaining
a more fine-granular control over the market. Nevertheless,
today’s market setup requires rigorous regulatory actions both
at the strategic (long run) and the operational (short run; day-
to-day business) level.
In this light, the present work proposes an alternative spec-
trum management regime (cf. Fig. 1, Self-regulating Setup),
which envisions to focus the regulatory involvement on strate-
gic measures, while operational control is replaced by a self-
regulated regime. In particular our approach aims at reliev-
ing regulators from actively steering and moderating market
entrances, market exits, and the redistribution of spectrum.
Of course, rather than replicating the unlicensed spectrum
organization (e.g., Wi-Fi) in the licensed spectrum, we intend
to assure a long term functioning of the exclusive spectrum in
coexistence to unlicensed spectrum solutions and as a happy
medium between today’s licensed and unlicensed spectrum
approaches.
Towards obtaining this goal the society spectrum is defined
as share w of the overall available spectrum, which is available
for auction. The society spectrum is shared among all MVNOs
and provided free of charge. For separation of powers reasons,
classical operators can only access the society spectrum them-
selves by creating a separately organised subsidiary, i.e., an
MVNO.
The factor w represents a weighting factor for the function-
ing of the self-regulation. If w is too low, consumer rights are
endangered (due to insufficient competitive market pressure),
but if w is too high the entire industry is endangered (due
to unprofitability). The paramterization of w is subject to the
considered market. For smaller countries such as Austria, the
number of 4 classical operators have added extensive market
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pressure, which may harm infrastructure investments in the
long run. The reduction to 3 operators, however, has led to
a disproportionate price increase5. Those extrema constitute
the action space for the society spectrum, thus ≈ 25% (of
comparable spectrum bands or band bundles) could initially
be assigned to the society spectrum in this case. The rest
is split among 3 winning operators A, B and C. Based on
functioning of the classical operator’s market (A, B, C), the
market pressure can be increased or lowered to almost one of
those extrema. The factor w, hence, models the relief spectrum,
where the level of competition moderates the usage of the
relief valve between both kinds of spectrums. In other words,
when providers A, B and C collude, the prices will go up or
the quality will stagnate, which will lower the utility Ue for
purchasing services from those providers. In today’s regime
we can assume that users will purchase a service as long as
their utility Ue is positive. With the introduction of the society
spectrum however, the utility gain Ue−Us needs to be positive.
Thus, in addition to remaining price-quality considerations of
consumers, the added value over the society spectrum utility
Ue creates additional pressure. The fewer people recognise
an added value of additional contracts, the lower will be the
market success of A, B, C. The opposite development kicks-in
when the quality in the society spectrum is low, while exclusive
spectrum offers are attractive.
In an assessment on “mission critical” services [20], the
creation of dedicated infrastructure is associated to high in-
vestment costs and a common need for backhaul services.
In analogy, the revised regulatory regime presented in this
work should limit the requirement for investments in separate
infrastructure in order to keep market barriers low. Hence, the
access to the society spectrum is enabled via the infrastructure
of the winning operators (A, B, C in our example) of the
licensed spectrum auction, i.e., MVNOs are accessing the
common spectrum via the RANs and backhaul networks of
classical cellular operators—cf. Fig. 2. Those cellular operators
have to open their infrastructure (primarily their RANs and
backhaul infrastructures) for MVNOs in order to be allowed
5http://www.bwb.gv.at/Aktuell/Seiten/Telekombranchenuntersuchung-
Zwischenstatus.aspx. Last accessed: 2015-03-27
to exclusively use their licensed spectrum. They may receive
a fixed and low compensation payment, which corresponds to
the line fees in the fixed line environment and may be strictly
regulated. The access to the society spectrum is free of charge
for MVNOs.
In our prior work on cellular traffic offload [3], we have
demonstrated that the Quality of Service (QoS) for commonly
accessible resources will be strictly lower than for exclusively
operated spectrum. In the example of Figure 1, the quality
of the publicly-moderated society spectrum will be lower
than in the exclusive spectrum of A, B, C. Nevertheless,
MVNOs may also distinguish themselves from other MVNOs
by purchasing a slice of the licensed spectrum, as is common
practice in today’s telecommunications industry, in order to
improve their QoS. Operator services may be bought from
any external service provider that is capable of meeting the
desired quality standards. This again entails a few notable
advancements over the current state of non-self-regulatory
control: 1) The society spectrum provides natural control over
the market, which shifts bigger market shares entirely to the
society spectrum whenever the prices become unreasonable.
Whenever the competition among MVNOs (solely in the
unlicensed spectrum) becomes too challenging, MVNOs may
exit the market (due to insufficient market prospects) or may
start a quality strategy (e.g., by purchasing more licensed
spectrum shares from network operators). 2) Classical cellular
operators (owning infrastructure) will have limited incentives
to enter the low cost and low profit MVNO-business, hence
strategies for intentional overload, such as envisioned in [3]
for Wi-Fi unlicensed spectrum, can be mitigated or eliminated.
3) Exclusively licensed spectrum will hold the premium traffic,
while the low cost and seamless access to the society spectrum
will substantially lower the Quality of Service (QoS) (cf. [3]).
Hence, both societal needs and business consideration of RAN
operators will be met. 4) Very low market entrance barriers
will probably provide the best approximation of a perfect
competition that can be constructed in a telecommunications
market. 5) The new approach facilitates the modularity both
on the technological and on the competitive axis, i.e., each
separate service faces a separate competitive situation of
directly interchangeable services and under transparent market
conditions.
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Fig. 3. Introducing self-regulation to the regulatory landscape.
In terms of regulation, the strict strategic (long-term) and
operational (short-term) regulation regime can be replaced by
a less rigorous counterpart in our new concept—see Figure
3. Due to the self-regulating properties, regulatory measures
on the operational level can be reduced to a minimum. The
incentives for A, B and C to misuse their market power, due
to their exclusive access to some spectrum, is eliminated by the
introduction of the society spectrum. Whenever product prices
increase disproportionately (e.g., due to collusion), the society
spectrum can relieve customers of some added pressure, i.e.,
some customers may terminate their contracts with exclusive
cellular operators. Due to the increased load in the society
spectrum and the falling revenues for operators A, B, and C, a
counter-reaction will be triggered, i.e., an equilibrium will be
found due to self-regulation. Of course, the proper strategic
setup and the observation of illegal business practices will
remain challenging tasks for the regulators.
Similarly, the unlicensed spectrum (mainly Wi-Fi) after the
introduction of LTE-U may be moderated and regulated in a
comparable fashion to the society spectrum. However, while
the society spectrum is semi-orchestrated and semi-hierarchical
(despite its self-regulatory nature), Wi-Fi bands should only
be regulated whenever the competition for supremacy over
resources becomes too fierce.
V. FAIRNESS CONCEPTS
A self-regulating system should further aim at assuring fair
distribution of resources among users, which in the present
case translates to a fair usage of spectrum. In the light of Net
Neutrality discussions, each byte is supposed to have “equal
rights” in the society spectrum, where no preferential treatment
or other kind of discriminatory action against individuals,
particular class of customers or services is allowed. Thus,
all users are treated equally and assisted by a cooperative
organization.
To this end, we recommend two complentary fair resource
allocation principles, which could in practice, e.g., be realized
based on a number of different resource sharing concepts and
queuing techniques (see below):
• Mutual user fairness: Based on the user base of the
MVNO, the MVNO gets assigned a corresponding portion
of the dedicated total of the society spectrum. In analogy,
the more users are represented by a single MVNO, the
higher the share of the dedicated society spectrum be-
comes for the physical network operator (e.g., A, B or C)
hosting the MVNO (cf. Section VI for detailed as well as
alternative realizations of this concept). The meaningful
and fair distribution of resources among society spectrum
users needs to be moderated by the MVNO and the by
relevant regulatory frameworks, based e.g. on well-known
queuing concepts like Weighted Fair Queueing (WFQ)
[21], [22] or Deficit Round Robin (DRR) [23]. The work
conservation property of WFQ and DRR thereby assures
that no resources are left unutilized (i.e., idle) in the
presence of users’ traffic demands.
• Spectrum conservation: Whenever a provider experi-
ences periods of underutilization (e.g., due to a lack of
customer interest induced by inappropriate pricing) its
licensed spectrum is dynamically added to the already
existent society spectrum-pool. The proposed approach is
work-conservative in that it will assure that idle licensed
spectrum is always at disposal for society spectrum users.
On a technical level, this scheme could be realized
based on a simple priority concept in which the licensed
spectrum users always assume absolute priority in the
utilization of the licensed spectrum.
The fair assignment of resources, in analogy to the mutual
user fairness principle, has extensively been studied in radio
access technology literature. For example Xu et al. [24]
assess fair scheduling mechanisms for the dynamic bandwidth
assignment and Quality of Service (QoS) differentiation in
WCDMA-based 3G and 4G networks. While they specifically
focus on the Generalized Processor Sharing (GPS) concept
[25], they also provide explicit reference to WFQ. Multi-user
fairness within Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks has been
addressed in [26] by specifying a proportional fairness sched-
uler. For unlicensed spectrum technologies, an architecture for
a distributed flavour of WFQ has been proposed in [27] for
Wi-Fi networks following the IEEE 802.11 standards6.
VI. SPECTRUM ASSIGNMENT MODELS
Following the defined fairness concepts, the corresponding
assignment of society spectrum shares needs to be put into the
context of the operator landscape. This section will discuss
models that translate the user’s fair share of the society
spectrum to solutions involving rationally-acting operators. A
specific challenge lies in the separation of the society spectrum
from each provider’s own spectrumin order to avoid cheating
practices, while using the same RAN. The following flavors
for realizing the access to the society spectrum exist:
1) Chaotic organization: Like the unlicensed spectrum
(e.g., Wi-Fi) the co-usage of the society spectrum may
not be regulated or organized in the classical sense. In
our model, every network operator would provide access
to the society spectrum but would not aim at controlling
the quality therein. Hence, apart from the infrastructure
co-use, no added value will be provided to end users over
today’s unlicensed spectrum solutions.
2) Billing: The society spectrum may be virtual and added
to the capacity of each operator’s exclusively owned
part. For every user the MVNO receives a share of the
society spectrum. Smart billing approaches may be used
to determine whether the usage is within the defined limits
for the designated society spectrum share. For excess
traffic, normal MVNO fees have to be paid in order to
compensate for the additional spectrum usage. However,
the associated billing, monitoring and verification process
would be highly complex. Hence, a practical usage ap-
pears to be unrealistic.
3) New virtual operator: A virtual operator can be created
in order to clearly keep apart the different kinds of
resources. The virtual operator is probably jointly owned
by all other operators (whether MVNOs or providers with
own RAN) and managed by a public non-profit organiza-
tion. In this paradigm, the costs are equally shared among
all market participants and all resources are provided
with low market barriers, whereby the infrastructures
of the RAN operators are reused to the greatest extent
possible. Due to the strict separation of market players
and spectrum resources, the appropriate usage of the
society spectrum is easy to monitor. However, from the
current technological point of view, session continuity
could become problematic whenever additional resource
are required for a particular session on a micro-flow level,
i.e., when users dynamically need to utilize exclusive
spectrum in order to satisfy the bandwidth demands which
exceed their individual society spectrum shares.
4) Per operator society spectrum: Each physical RAN
operator runs a specific share of the society spectrum. The
6The Working Group for WLAN Standards: http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/
802/11/, last accessed: May 5, 2019
size of its spectrum share corresponds to the sum of end
users represented by the MVNOs hosted by the physical
operator and the number of the physical operator’s cus-
tomers themselves. In other words, the size of the society
spectrum share for each physical RAN operator directly
corresponds to the number of users that utilize the RAN
operator’s infrastructure. This scheme is able to provide
fair spectrum shares to the individual users, provided that
the size of the society spectrum share for each physical
operator can regularly (e.g., once per month) be adjusted
to the number of users it effectively hosts. Compared to
the new virtual operator flavor, this model can seamlessly
assure dynamic spectrum assignment to the individual
microflows whenever the users’ society spectrum shares
cannot accommodate their traffic demands.
The fair assignment of spectrum may face additional diffi-
culties like the following: Users may create several contracts
with different or the same provider in order to obtain a larger
share of the society spectrum. As this behaviour represents
a dominant strategy, the assignment of a fair share of society
spectrum to human users should be associated with an identity
check. To this end, the regulator could for example provide
each human user with a personal and unique access code to
the society spectrum, which the user can simultaneously use
only via a single physical network infrastructure.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The present work has proposed a novel “self-regulating”
spectrum market design in which essential coordination func-
tions known from the current cellular paradigms are kept
unchanged, whereas the regulator is simultaneously relieved
of excessive day-to-day operations’ oversight. Self-regulation
in our work refers to the automatic balancing of interests due
to an intelligent distribution of market powers. This has been
obtained by introducing the concept of a “society spectrum”,
which guarantees a fair fulfillment of minimal connectivity
demands for all users at very low costs. We have further
illustrated the practicability of our design by constructing a
relationship to fair radio access principles, e.g., based on WFQ
scheduling, and by illustrating the assignment of spectrum
shares to individual operators in correspondence to the rep-
resented user base. In future works, we target the detailed
linkage to cognitive radio solutions and the conduction of
corresponding simulations to study the market regime stability.
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